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NOTES AND COMMENTS
other's wife,35 was living in a state of fornication with his mis-
tress;8e was assaulted without provocation after first combat had
ceased.3 7
In Zohner v. Sierra Nevada Life & Casualty Co.,38 where insured
was killed when he drove his car against a pillar on the sidewalk on
the left side of the street, recovery was allowed though the policy
excluded injuries sustained while violating law. The California
court said that the mere fact that a car is driven upon the left side
of the highway or across a sidewalk does not, under all circumstances,
constitute a violation of law. This seems to be a better resfilt than
that reached by the court in the principal case. The rule requiring
one to drive on the right side of the road applies ordinarily only when
one vehicle meets another5 9 What difference should it make in the
liability of the insurer whether the insured while driving along a
straight unobstructed highway happened to run off the left instead
of the right-hand side of the road?
JULE MCMICHAEL.
Judgments.-Effect of Personal Property Exemption.
By virtue of the North Carolina Constitution1 a resident debtor
is entitled to $500 personal property free from execution for the col-
lection of a debt, this exemption being subject to allotment upon
demand at any time before the process is executed by a sale.2
In a recent North Carolina cases the plaintiff held a valid judg-
ment against the defendant for $3,650. Execution had been returned
unsatisfied. Defendant was the owner of four life insurance policies
under whose health benefit clauses he was receiving $300 monthly.
Plaintiff, by supplemental proceedings, sought to reach this $300
monthly benefit and apply it on his judgment. The court held that
the defendant should be allowed to select the $300 each month as a
part of his $500 personal property exemption, so that at all times he
Supreme Lodge K. P. v. Crenshaw, 129 Ga. 195, 58 S. E. 628 (1907).
I Acc. Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 90 Tenn. 256, 16 S. W. 723 (1891).
' Grose v. Liberty Industrial Ins. Co., 6 La. App. 390 (1927).
Supra note 25.
"Mike v. Levy, 210 App. Div. 813, 206 N. Y. Supp. 4 (1924) ; Weinstein
v. Wheeler, 135 Ore. 518, 295 Pac. 196 (1931); Segerstrom v. Lawrence, 64
Wash. 245, 116 Pac. 876 (1911); see Dole v. Lublin, 112 Conn. 603, 153 AUt.
856, 858 (1931) ; Reid v. McDevitt, 140 So. 722, 723 (Miss. 1932).
'Article X §1.
2 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §737.
1 Commissioner of Banks v. Yelverton, 204 N. C. 441, 168 S. E. 505 (1933).
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should have the amount of $500 which could not be reached by the
creditor. No matter how frequently creditors may bring execution
against the debtor he is entitled to ask for a reassignment of his per-
sonal property exemption at each different levy.4 Accordingly, if
between the first and second levies the debtor has consumed half of
his previous exemption he is entitled, upon the second levy, to re-
plenish the remainder by $250, bringing the total exemption back to
the $500 allowed. The creditor cannot avoid the exemption by hav-
ing the payments not yet due declared subject to the payment of his
debt.
5
If the plaintiff, in a proper case, had attempted to reach the prop-
erty of the defendant by attachment and garnishment instead of by
judgment and execution the result would have been the same. An
attachment is in the nature of a preliminary execution against the
property of the defendant which is subject to levy; and garnishment
is used to reach the debtor's property which is in the hands of a
third person and not subject to actual levy. A resident debtor can
claim his exemptions as against such proceeding.8
If the plaintiff, a resident creditor seeking to avoid the exemption
laws of this state, should proceed in the courts of another state by
attachment and garnishment against a non-resident debtor of a resi-
dent defendant, he may thus succeed in reaching property to be
applied to his debt;7 but since both plaintiff and defendant are in
such case residents of the state, the defendant may ask the court to
grant an injunction to restrain the creditor from proceeding in the
other state.8 If the plaintiff is a non-resident and should proceed by
garnishment against a debtor of the defendant in another state, the
IFrost v. Naylor, 68 N. C. 325 (1873) ; Shepherd v. Murrill, 90 N. C. 208
(1884) ; Pate v. Harper, 94 N. C. 23 (1886) ; Jones v. Alsbrook, 115 N. C. 46,
20 S. E. 170 (1894); Gardner v. McConnaughey, 157 N. C. 481, 73 S. E. 125
(1911); Befarrah v. Spell, 178 N. C. 231, 100 S. E. 321 (1919).
12 R. C. L. 800 ("By reason of the rule that the garnishing creditor can
reach no more than the garnishee owes the principal debtor.")
6 Gamble v. Rhyne, 80 N. C. 183 (1879); McINTosn, N. C. PcrlcE AND
PROCEDURE (1929) §§809 (3), 819.
Chicago, Rock Island & P. R. Co. v. Strum, 174 U. S. 710, 19 Sup. Ct.
797, 43 L. ed. 1144 (1899). ("It is held generally that exemption laws are a
part of the remedy of the forum and have no force beyond the bounds of the
state enacting them." Armour Fertilizer Works v. Sanders, 63 F. (2d) 902
(1933) ; Goodwin v. Claytor, 137 N. C. 224, 49 S. E. 173 (1904) ; Penn. R. Co.
v. Rogers, 52 W. Va. 450, 44 S. E. 300 (1903) ; McIntosh, op. cit. supra note 6
§758.
' Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 33 L. ed. 538 (1889);
Morton v. Hull, 77 Tex. 80, 13 S. W. 849 (1890); Wierse v. Thomas, 145
N. C. 261, 59 S. E. 58 (1907).
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defendant would not be allowed to set up his personal property ex-
emption since it applies only within the state.9 Where a resident
debtor has brought action against his debtor and reduced his claim
to a judgment in this state, a non-resident creditor cannot reach the
amount due. on such judgment by attachment and garnishment in
another state.10 While this will protect the exemption of the debtor
in this state, the reason for such ruling is to preserve the control of
the court over the judgment rendered, since this would be interfered
with by the garnishment of the judgment debtor.
From this discussion the following conclusions may be drawn:
(1) The resident debtor's personal property exemption is afforded
complete protection from execution (a) where the creditor is a
resident of this state, and (b) where the creditor, although a non-
resident, brings action within this state; (2) the debtor cannot pro-
tect his exemption where the creditor, a non-resident, brings his
action in a state foreign to the debtor.
J. CARLYLE RUTLEDGE.
Landlord and Tenant-SetOffs Against Lease Deposits.
A deposited $3,000 with B as a binder to insure A's taking pos-
session of a store under a build and lease contract.' A later became
indebted to B on a collateral agreement for construction extras. A
then assigned the deposit to C and later went bankrupt. Held, B is
entitled to a set-off for the extras against C.2 As the assignee can
take no more than the assignor had,3 the real question at issue is
what were B's rights against A, the assignor.
Such deposits are generally held not to create a debtor-creditor
- relationship. Two cases especially may be pointed out. In one, the
'Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625, 49 L. ed. 1023 (1904);
Sexton v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 132 N. C. 1, 43 S. E. 479 (1903) ; Balk v.
Harris, 132 N. C. 10, 43 S. E. 477 (1903) ; Watson v. Seaboard R. Co., 198
N. C. 471, 152 S. E. 408 (1930) ; Penn. R. Co. v. Rogers, supra note 7.
" Manufacturing Co. v. Freeman, 175 N. C. 212, 95 S. E. 367 (1918);
Wabash R. Co. v. Tourville, 179 U. S. 322, 21 Sup. Ct. 113, 45 L. ed. 210
(1900); Shinn v. Zimmerman, 3 Zabriskie (N. J.) 150 (1851); McIntosh,
op. cit. supra note 6 §819.
1 Receipt for the deposit read: "Received of A, check for Three Thousand
Dollars ($3,000.00) to be held by us as a binder to guarantee your carrying out
lease made between yourselves and B, said lease being on store located at ....
same to be returned when satisfactory bond is furnished or when you begin
occupying store. Signed, B." *
'Commercial National Bank v. Cutter Realty Co., 205 N. C. 99, 170 S. E.
139 (1933).
' Bank v. Bynum, 84 N. C. 24 (1881) ; N. C. CODE Aix. (Michie, 1931) §446.
